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The most salient feature of ﬁnancial dollarization, and the one that causes more concern to
policymakers, is its persistence: even after successful macroeconomic stabilizations, dollarization
ratios often remain high. In this paper we claim that this persistence is connected to the fact that
the participants in the dollar deposit market are fairly heterogenous, and so is the way they form
their optimal currency portfolio. We develop a simple model when agents differ in their ability to
process information, which turns out to be enough to generate persistence upon aggregation. We
ﬁnd empirical support for this claim with data from three Latin American countries and Poland.
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11 Motivation
Even though dollarization is a relatively new research area, the experiences of many Latin American
and transition economies during the 1990’s has inspired a growing and rich body of related
literature.1 Dollarizationisnormallyassociatedwiththepartialsubstitutionofthedomesticcurrency
by a foreign currency (the US dollar) as a store of value, as opposed to currency substitution which
refers to the use of the foreign currency as a medium of exchange.
Inthispaperdollarizationmeansdepositdollarization2 whichleadseventuallytocreditdollarization
and to the vulnerability of the ﬁnancial system of highly dollarized countries. As stressed by
Cook (2004) and C´ espedes et. al (2004), the efﬁcacy of monetary policy in small open economies
with ﬂexible exchange rates is compromised by the negative balance sheet effects generated by
dollarization. In this case, sudden real depreciations can have detrimental consequences on the
economic activity by reducing the net worth of ﬁrms and generating adverse effects on investment.
This situation gives a rationale for a “fear of ﬂoating” behavior of central banks (Calvo and Reinhart,
2002; Mor´ on and Winkelried, 2005).
One of the most salient features of dollarization, and probably the one that causes more concern to
policymakers, is its persistence. It is well documented that dollarization increases sharply during
episodes of unduly macroeconomic instability and that it remains stubbornly high even after
successful stabilizations.3 A top-of-mind explanation of the hysteresis is lack of conﬁdence in
domestic currency assets as a result of the traumas brought by past inﬂation, devaluations, banking
crises, and so on. This, however, is not very consistent with the strong macroeconomic fundamentals
observed in several highly dollarized countries (e.g., Peru in the early 2000’s).
An alternative avenue to address this puzzle is to adapt the existing currency substitution literature
1 See De Nicol´ o et. al (2005), Levy Yeyati (2006) and the references therein.
2 This is also known as asset substitution (Reinhart et. al, 2003) or ﬁnancial dollarization (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003).
3 See Guidotti and Rodr´ ıguez (1992), Savastano (1996), Quispe (2000) and Kamin and Ericsson (2003).
2based on adjustment costs or network externalities. Guidotti and Rodr´ ıguez (1992), Sturzenegger
(1997) and Uribe (1997) develop models where the cost of using the dollar for transactions depends
negatively on the aggregate currency substitution ratio, so once transactions get dollarized, there is
no beneﬁt to switch back to using domestic currency if others continue using dollars. An obvious
limitation is that this approach refers to the medium-of-exchange and not to the store-of-value
function of money. Moreover, these models rely heavily on a knowledge stock that drives the
persistence (a “ratchet variable”), so even though they can explain upward trends in the depth of
dollarization, they are not useful in explaining how to dedollarize, as this may imply an implausible
reduction in the knowledge stock.
Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) provide a different framework for modelling dollarization. They derive
a minimum variance portfolio (MVP) that depends on the relative volatility of inﬂation and real
depreciation rates. Dollarization would persist even when inﬂation is low and stable insofar as the
realdepreciationvolatilityissmallerthanthatofinﬂation.However,thisframeworkisstaticwhereas
persistence is inherently a dynamic phenomenon. In our view, the MVP approach which is by
now very popular and has proven successful in explaining cross-sectional variation of dollarization
levels,4 was not designed to deal with dynamics since the MVP, the underlying equilibrium level of
dollarization, depends on unconditional moments.5
Curiously, a fact that researchers have apparently overlooked is the very nature of the participants of
the dollar deposit market in dollarized economies: depositors are extremely heterogenous, ranging
from large entrepreneurs to small ﬁrms to non-proﬁt organizations and to individuals (rich and
4 Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) provide empirical evidence that the MVP has some explanatory power for the average
level of dollarization across countries. De Nicol´ o et. al (2005) extends this empirical analysis by considering a
broader set of countries.
5 Dollarizationhysteresisisobservedinseveralcountrieswithhighrealexchangeratevolatility,e.g.Russia.Thereason
of this apparent contradiction with the portfolio approach may be that it is very difﬁcult to get a sound estimate of
the unconditional variances that compose the MVP.
3not-so-wealthy).6 Participation costs in the dollar market are virtually nil due to liberalization,
deregulation and, importantly, due to the emergence of informal currency traders – known as
cambistas in many Latin American countries – which beneﬁt from buying and selling dollars with
tighter markups than those in the banking sector.7 A typical cambista would hold a limited amount
of money for business (say, between US$2,000 and US$5,000) as she is aimed to meet the dollar
demand for individuals or small ﬁrms, normally unwilling to pay the higher bank premium to
get their savings dollarized.8 As a result, participation becomes independent of the scale of the
transaction and hence widespread.
The aim of this paper is to draw the attention to the fact that heterogeneity of depositors can easily
explain the persistence of ﬁnancial dollarization. As pointed out by Granger (1980), differences
in individual dynamics lead to aggregate persistence. Thus, as it is reasonable to expect that the
dynamics of the optimal currency portfolio of a ﬁnancial expert differs from that of a blacksmith,
a persistent aggregate dollarization ratio arises naturally. There are of course various differences
between a ﬁnancial expert and a blacksmith, but provided that both access the dollar deposit market
almost for free, the relevant difference to our analysis centers in their ability to process information
and, therefore, to take informed portfolio decisions.9
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we brieﬂy explore these issues using
Peruvian and Polish data.10 For reasons explained below, these cases illustrate nicely our claim
about the interplay between individual heterogeneity and aggregate persistence. Besides, it gives us
an idea of how the dollar deposit markets in representative countries are shared among various types
6 An exception is Sturzenegger (1997) who studies the implications of income inequality on currency substitution, yet
with no reference to deposit dollarization.
7 Ag´ enor and Haque (1996) provide an account of informal currency markets.
8 Even large ﬁrms may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to trade with a pool of (well-organized) cambistas.
9 Surely, income differences can also be important if the income gap between the ﬁnancial expert and the blacksmith
is wide. However, we ﬁnd that in dollarized economies the dollar deposit participation of (many) ﬁrms and (a lot of)
individuals can be taken roughly as having the same importance.
10 The ﬁgures used in section 2 come from the Central Bank of Peru and the National Bank of Poland. The facts
discussed there are recorded in the annual reports of these institutions.
4of depositors.
In section 3 we develop a stylized model where agents face noisy information and differ in their
ability to forecast when taking portfolio decisions. An important result from this setup is that the
dynamics of the individual’s optimal portfolio depends on her prediction errors of future dollar
returns. It turns out that it is optimal for agents to be cautious when modifying the currency
composition of their deposits as there is uncertainty on the quality of the data agents receive. This
caution is reﬂected in portfolios that may adjust in a relatively slow fashion. Finally, we show that
upon aggregation of the individual dollarization decisions it is possible to generate a very persistent
economy-wide dollarization ratio.11
In section 4 we test the empirical hypotheses of the theoretical model and ﬁnd supportive evidence
from aggregate data of three Latin American countries and Poland. The results suggest that the
distributions of “forecasting abilities” behind the aggregate dollarization ratios are very spread and
skewed. We regard this result as consistent with the idea of ﬁnancial experts sharing the dollar
market with blacksmiths that save in dollars. In section 5 we discuss possible extensions to the
analysis. Section 6 concludes and gives policy recommendations. Derivations and complementary
results are shown in the appendix.
2 Two illustrative cases
As documented by Savastano (1996), dollarization emerges progressively in response to
macroeconomic instability, particularly high levels of inﬂation, showing a well-deﬁned pattern: ﬁrst
agents replace domestic currency as reserve of value, holding usually dollars outside the ﬁnancial
11 Our approach is related to other branches of the literature. For instance, Lewbel (1994) uses aggregate information
to test heterogeneity on consumption dynamics whereas Michelacci (2004) explains the high degree of persistence
of output with the cross-sectional heterogeneity of productive ﬁrms.
5system (“under the mattress”). Then, the dollar is used in some transactions, typically involving real
estates and durable goods, and eventually some prices are set in dollars. Most governments later on
allow banks to issue deposits in foreign currency to avoid ﬁnancial disintermediation.12 The actual
experience of various countries shows that within a year an economy can increase its dollarization
ratio enormously, see Figures 1(a) and 2(a).
On the other side, episodes of dedollarization (i.e., a sustained reduction in the dollarization ratio)
are not very common and thus there is no well-established pattern in the literature. Yet, if ever
happened, the dedollarization process is likely to be slow. The analysis of these events, as opposed
to the increase of dollarization, provide very useful information about the way different depositors
decide the currency composition of their savings and on how they respond to news coming from the
macroeconomic environment.
2.1 Peru in the early 2000’s
Although the Peruvian dollarization experience shares various of the aforementioned features, it
has its own appeal.13 As shown in Figure 1(a), in 1991 (after a four-digit hyperinﬂation in 1990)
the ratio was 60% and has remained ﬂuctuating roughly between 65% and 70% for a decade. Since
2000, it has shown a sustained reduction to about 50% in 2005. Of course, 50% is still a big number,
but there are some interesting facts behind this recent drop.
There are at least two forces driving this decrease. Firstly, after 8 years of announcing inﬂation
targets within a monetary targeting regime (since 1994) and after 5 years of having achieved a one-
digit inﬂation rate, the Central Bank announced the adoption of a fully ﬂedged inﬂation targeting
regime in 2002. This has helped to anchor inﬂation expectations and has reduced inﬂation and
12 See also Kamin and Ericsson (2003), De Nicol´ o et. al (2005) and Levy Yeyati (2006).
13 See Quispe (2000) for a careful historical account of the dollarization experience in Peru.
6nominal interest rate volatility. Secondly, between 2001 and 2005, the nominal and real exchange
rates have appreciated (6.2% and 5.1%) as a result of a very favorable foreign environment:
increasing terms of trade leading to an export boom and very low international interest rates. In
a nutshell, the real return to holding deposits dollars vis-` a-vis holding deposits in domestic currency
has fallen considerably in the early 2000’s.
Figure 1(b) shows deposit dollarization by type of deposit: demand, savings and a breakdown of
time deposits in certiﬁcates, “CTS” and others. A glimpse of the ﬁgure reveals that both demand and
“CTS”depositshavenotreactedtotherecentchangeinthedollarrealreturntrend.Demanddeposits
accounts for about 20% of total deposits and as the most liquid, almost transactional kind of deposit
the ﬂat pattern is justiﬁed. On the other side, the CTS is the Peruvian version of an unemployment
insurance; by law, it is hold exclusively by individuals and can be claimed only when an individual
becomes unemployed. The CTS deposits have reacted even less than the demand deposits, which is
puzzling.
Theﬁgurealsoshowsamoderatedownwardtrendinthesavingsandothertimedeposits.About80%
of the saving and roughly half of the other time deposits are held by individuals. From 2001 to 2005
both ratios have decreased in about 10%. What is remarkable from Figure 1(b) is the strong reaction
of the certiﬁcate of deposits ratio which has fallen in almost 40%, and with no doubts is driving
the fall in the aggregate ratio of Figure 1(a). The interesting fact is that although the certiﬁcate of
deposits have similar term than the CTS and the other time deposits, they are mainly held by ﬁrms
and not individuals.
2.2 Poland towards a market economy
The Polish experience is regarded as the most successful shift from a planned to a market-oriented
economy, and is a thriving example of dedollarization. By the end 1980’s, Poland was on the verge
7of a profound economic crisis. The huge distortions on relative prices and the cumulative ﬁscal
deﬁcits, inherited from the years of central planning, induced a rapid increase in inﬂation that
reached its historical maximum of 550 percent in 1989. In response to this unstable macroeconomic
environment, dollarization ratios increased rapidly, from levels around 20% in 1985 to a peak of
60% in 1989. This is shown in Figure 2(a).
After the introduction of a series of pro-market reforms and of a stabilization program (the so-
called “shock-therapy”),14 dollarization ratios dropped to averages of 40% percent by the end of
1993, hand-to-hand with the reduction of inﬂation (from 500% to 36%). As the macroeconomic
conditions kept improving, additional institutional reforms were put in place. Notably, in 1997 the
National Bank of Poland was granted independence and a well-deﬁned objective: to guarantee price
stability. Dollarization decreased even more reaching by 2001 the level of 18%, comparable with
that of developed European economies, as the UK.
A common feature of the Polish experience with the Peruvian one discussed above is the observed
heterogeneity of dollarization dynamics among type of deposits. Figure 2(b) reveals that by the end
of 1993, the difference between the dollarization ratios of households and ﬁrms was of the order
of 70% for time deposit and 40% for demand deposits. These differences remained on the range of
20% for more than 4 years.
2.3 Moral
The differences between how individuals and ﬁrms decide their portfolio composition is obvious.
Usually ﬁrms have more resources allocated to the management of their funds, whereas individuals
often base their decisions on their experience, those of some neighbors and their limited access to
14 A drastic series of institutional and market reforms were put in place in 1990: the government liberalized controls
of almost all prices, eliminated most subsidies, abolished administrative allocation of resources in favor of trade,
promoted free establishment of private businesses, liberalized the system of international economic relations, and
introduced an internal currency convertibility with a currency devaluation of 32%.
8information. Moreover, the decision-making even within ﬁrms or within individuals is likely to be
dissimilar. Our brief inspection of the Peruvian and Polish experiences illustrates our main claim
that these differences accounts for much heterogeneity in dollarization decisions. We next analyze
how this translates into persistence.
3 A simple model
We use a simple framework to show how the combination of imperfect, noisy information on real
returns of foreign assets, and specially the heterogeneity among market participants can generate a
persistent degree of dollarization.
The model economy is populated by a number of almost identical individuals. They share the same
endowment, which is normalized to one, and the same preferences, but they differ in their ability to
process information and therefore in their expectations on future outcomes.15
Every period agents choose the composition of their portfolio between two assets, one that offers a
ﬁxed real return RP which is denominated in domestic currency (pesos from now on) and the other
denominated in dollars with real return RD
t . The real ex-ante excess of return of the dollar over the
pesos asset is simply Rt = RD
t −RP.
3.1 Portfolio decision
Depositors are risk adverse. Individual i devotes an amount xit of her savings to the dollar asset
and the remaining 1−xit to purchase the asset in pesos. We follow Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) in
postulating a standard mean-variance utility function. The portfolio decision is ex-ante and based on
15 Our analysis hold for agents with heterogenous endowments, i.e. wealth/income inequality, as long as they are
correlated with the abilities to process information. See appendix C for details.
9imperfect information on real returns, so utility for individual i is deﬁned in terms of the conditional












−0.5vart (xitRt+1) = xitˆ rit+1+RP−0.5(xit)2vit+1 (1)
where ˆ rit+1 and vit+1 are the mean and variance of the excess return Rt that individual i expects for
period t +1, conditional on information up to period t.





Thus, agents will increase their dollar deposits when they expect a higher real return on this asset for
the same expected variance, or when the expect a lower variance given a level of excess of returns.
3.2 Forecasting
As equation (2) reveals, the only relevant pieces of information for portfolio decisions are the ex-
ante excess return and its variance. To make things easier, consider that each agent focuses directly
on forecasting Rt, and not on forecasting its components (RD
t or RP, which may imply forecasting
inﬂation, depreciation, conﬁscation risk and so on), and assume that Rt follows a general AR(1)
process
Rt+1 = µ(1−α)+αRt +wt+1 wt ∼ iid(0,σ2
w) (3)
16 We have imposed a value of one to the risk aversion parameter in the utility function. This assumption is harmless to
our results.
10In period t, the excess return Rt cannot be perfectly observed. What agents observe is an
idiosyncratic noise-ridden version of Rt, Sit = Rt + εit where εit ∼ iid(0,σ2
εi). Our assumption
that agents receive different signals can be easily rationalized as a reduced form of a problem
where agents face a common signal, but they have different capacity for processing aggregate
information. As in Sims (2003), when agents face limited capacity for processing information, they
would choose optimally how much effort to allocate in certain activities, as portfolio management.
Since individuals face different resources and capacity constraints, when agents have to invest
real resources to increase its capacity for processing information on management activities – for
instance, to learn how to read and interpret ﬁnancial news – they can rationally choose to allocate
different capacity for processing information on this activity, therefore agents would eventually face
different signals.
Each individual has a forecasting model of the form
Rt+1 = µ(1−α)+αRt +wt+1 wt ∼ iid(0,σ2
w)
Sit = Rt +εit εit ∼ iid(0,σ2
εi)
(4)
Since Sit is a noisy indicator, individual i has ﬁrst to extract Rt from Sit (i.e., “nowcasting”) and then
forecast its mean and variance to implement (2). Deﬁne qi = σ2
w/σ2
εi as signal-to-noise ratio which
plays a key role in determining how the noisy observations are weighted for signal extraction and
prediction. The higher is qi the more past observations are discounted in forecasting the future.
As it can be seen from (4), each individual is given a value of qi to perform her predictions,
and this value alone determines the whole forecasting model. This is the only source of (cross-
sectional) heterogeneity in this setup. Everything else – α, µ, σ2
w and the process (3) – is of common
knowledge across individuals.
That individuals are heterogenous in their ability to extract information from they signal rationalizes
11in a simple manner the fact that those with high qi (the ﬁnancial experts) are able to extract more
information from the noisy indicator Sit than those with low qi (the blacksmiths). In contrast to the
latter,theformermightbeabletodistinguishwhetherchangesinSit revealunderlyingmovementsin
Rt or are just due to noise. This in turn implies differences in the speed in which short-run forecasts
are adjusted as new information becomes available, and translates directly to portfolio differences
among market participants. We interpret this heterogeneity as differences in the ability people have
to forecast.
Deﬁne vit = Et

(Rt − ˆ rit)2
as the mean squared error (MSE) of the predictor ˆ rit. Standard results
from the signal extraction literature lead us to the optimal prediction rule17
ˆ rit+1 = µ(1−α)+α ˆ rit +kit(Sit − ˆ rit) = µ(1−α)+(α −kit)ˆ rit +kitSit (5)
where the forecasted value of Rt for next period is the projection of today’s forecasted value plus a
correction, an updating that is proportional to the latest prediction error incurred (Sit − ˆ rit).18 The



















17 The reader that is familiar with state-space modeling will note that the recursions (5) and (7) below are
straightforward applications of the Kalman ﬁlter. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, ch. 2 and ch. 21) and Harvey
and De Rossi (2006) for further details.
18 It is important to emphasize that ˆ rit represents the best forecast of Rt conditional on information up to period t −1.
Since portfolio decisions are to be taken one period in advance, they do not incorporate the information contained on
the signal Sit, but this information is taken into account to improve the next period’s forecast of Rt+1.
12For expositional convenience deﬁne ˜ vit = vitσ−2





It is clear from equation (8) that ˜ viτ+1 = f(˜ viτ). There is a ﬁxed point such that ˜ vi = f(˜ vi)19 and
moreover, since f0(˜ vi) < 1 it is globally stable: regardless of the initial condition ˜ vi0 we have that
˜ viτ → ˜ vi and consequently kiτ → ki = α ˜ vi(˜ vi+1)−1 as τ → ¥. This means that as τ becomes larger,
i.e. as each individual has performed the signal extraction exercise a number of times, the updating
process deﬁned in (5) and (7) converges to an equilibrium rule.20 If it is assumed that this recursive
process was initialized long before period t then ˜ vit (or vit) and kit can be safely treated as constants
that depends on qi. This fact simpliﬁes the calculations considerably without compromising our
conclusions.
To have a better grasp of the way heterogeneity among agents affects their forecasts (and portfolios),
assume for a moment that α → 1 and solve (5) recursively to get





It is clear from this geometrically distributed lag expression that different draws of qi (and hence of
ki) are associated with different ways of weighting the available information (the noisy indicators
up to period t) in order to produce a forecast.21
19 The ﬁxed point is the positive root of ˜ v2
i +[(1−α2)−qi]˜ vi−qi = 0.
20 Convergence is monotonic (˜ viτ ≥ ˜ viτ+1 ≥ ˜ vi) because viτ+1 is based on more information than viτ.
21 As noted in Harvey (1989, ch. 4), the forecasting model converges to the popular Exponential Smoothing method
(ES) if α →1. However, the scheme explained here is optimal in the sense that it minimizes the one step ahead MSE,
whereas ES is basically ad hoc.
133.3 Individual dynamics
Using the fact that vit → vi, kit → ki and the optimal updating/forecasting rule (5), the optimal dollar





















After plugging (5) into (9), we get
xit = aixit−1+ci+biSit (10)
where ai = (α −ki), ci = µ(1−α)v−1
i and bi = (˜ vi +1)−1. The individual’s dollarization ratio
follows an autoregressive process and, as such, exhibits some degree of persistence that depends
on ki. It is easy to show that ki is increasing in qi, which implies that the individuals with higher
qi (those who gain more information from the signal each period) have less persistent dollarization
ratios. As (10) shows, the higher the ki, the lower the degree of persistence of dollarization ratios.
Furthermore, individuals with low qi will tend to consider the dollar asset as less risky, since they
would attach a higher fraction of the variance of the signal to the noise and not to real excess return.
The dynamics of individual dollarization decisions shows that with noisy signals of returns,
individuals have to rely on past information to optimally forecast them, and have to react with
caution to news. To the extent that past portfolio decisions contain past information of returns, it
becomes optimal for individuals to make their dollarization ratios depended on past dollarization
ratios.22 Thus, our simple model shows that noisy information can render not only persistence but
22 A similar result but in a different setup can be found in Aoki (2003). In that paper the central bank sets interest rates
in an environment with noisy information on output and inﬂation. The optimal policy rule implies some persistence
coming from the cautiousness that the lack of perfect information demands.
14also an higher individual dollarization ratio.
3.4 Aggregate dynamics
In a static world the effects of aggregation are well-known: it tends to smooth away individual
erratic movements and to ﬁll in discontinuities that may be present at the disaggregate level. Within
a dynamic framework, aggregation also increases persistence.23 To see why consider a group of
individuals who hold a small amount of the dollar asset and face an aggregate shock that makes it
more attractive (e.g., a strong real depreciation). According to (10), these individuals will increase
their dollar holdings immediately. But then, they will also revise their expectations about future
returns in favor of the dollar asset, thereby perpetuating the impact effect of the shock on aggregate
dollarization. Thus, the moderate persistence in the individual portfolio formation due to the lack of
perfect information, summarized in equation (10), is exacerbated by aggregation.24
Consider that qi is drawn from a distribution such that the cdf of ai is F(a). To better understand
the workings of aggregation and how aggregate data can help us to draw conclusions about the
underlying heterogeneity in dollarization decisions, it is convenient to focus for a moment on the
case where the individuals signals, Sit, are iid sequences. We then relax this assumption.
3.4.1 Aggregation when signals are iid
Appendix A shows that aggregation of (10) across the distribution of ai renders the following





AjXt−j+ ˜ C+ ˜ Ut (11)
23 The classic reference for the econometrics of this effect is Granger (1980), which assumes that F(a) (deﬁned below)
is a Beta distribution. See also Pesaran (2003) and Zaffaroni (2004) for recent developments.
24 See Michelacci (2004) for a similar analysis.
15where the Aj (j = 1,2,...) are coefﬁcients, ˜ C is a constant and ˜ Ut is an aggregate serially
uncorrelated disturbance. As suggested before, the remarkable fact is that although at the individual
level the dollar share in the portfolio follows an AR(1) process, it becomes AR(¥) at the aggregate
– usually known as a process exhibiting long-memory.
As stressed by Lewbel (1994), the coefﬁcients in (11) are tightly related to the shape of F(a). In





ms−jAj for s = 1,2,... (12)
where ms is the s-th moment of the distribution of ai, ms =
R
asdF(a). Hence, it is easy to verify that






These relations allow us to determine how the distribution of forecasting abilities affects persistence
at the aggregate level. The higher A1, the higher the mean which implies that the average individual
has herself a more persistent behavior, rendering subsequently a more persistent Xt. On the other
side and strikingly, a higher A2 renders also more persistence: the higher the heterogeneity among
individuals, the more persistent the aggregate dollarization ratio. Finally, as pointed out by Zaffaroni
(2004), the low frequency behavior of the aggregate is determined by the shape of the cross sectional
distribution as ai → 1−. Hence, a distribution with a heavy left tail (A3 < A1A2), which indicates a
higher mass of persistent individuals (ai ≈ 1), would suggest higher aggregate persistence.
It is now clear that this framework can be tested straightforwardly. If the estimates of As using
aggregate data are inconsistent with the notion of various dynamic processes that have been
16aggregated into (11), then we are to reject the model.25 The most obvious symptoms of contradiction
would be a non-positive estimate of A2, the variance of ai,26 or a very negative value for A1, the
mean.
3.4.2 Aggregation when signals are correlated
Recall now that Sit = Rt +εit, where εit is an idiosyncratic shock. Then, the aggregation of (9) (see









BjRt−j+ ˆ C+ ˆ Ut (13)
which as opposed to (11) includes a distributed lag of Rt. This difference is clearly a consequence of
postulating different assumptions about the nature of Sit. Yet, the coefﬁcients As (s = 1,2,...) have
the same interpretation and implications as before.
4 Empirical evidence
This section tests whether the dynamics of the aggregate dollarization ratio in selected countries
can be regarded as coming from the aggregation of heterogeneous depositors. It is important
to bear in mind that the amount of information about individual behavior that can be inferred
from aggregate data, as we attempt to do below, is unquestionably limited. Different assumptions
regarding individual decisions can be found to be consistent with a given observed aggregate
variable. Yet, the facts reported below are supportive to the main hypothesis of this paper and the
predictions of the theoretical model.
25 Or the assumptions behind the aggregation, see appendix A.
26 Note that A2 = 0 implies a degenerate distribution of ai on the point A1, i.e. a model with a representative agent or
identical individuals.
17As discussed, the moments of the underlying distribution F(a) are linked with the autoregressive
coefﬁcients As in equations (11) and (13), so by estimating them we can investigate the extent of
heterogeneity among participants in the dollar deposit market via the analysis of summary statistics.
To compute further ﬁgures of interest, as conﬁdence intervals, we inevitably need to impose some
assumptions on F(a) and parameterize it. Contemporaneous aggregation of equation (10) does not
involve a speciﬁc distribution, but the microeconomic structure in section 2 indicates that F(a) is
truncated: it is easy to verify that ai → 0 (or ki → α) if qi → ¥ and ai → α (or ki → 0) as qi → 0.
Thus, to ease the interpretation of the results and to have a better grasp of the shape of the underlying
F(a), we map from the estimate coefﬁcients to the moments using (12) and then map these moments
to the parameters of a sufﬁciently ﬂexible truncated distribution. Empirically α ≈ 1, so we focus
on the support a ∈ [0,1]. A distribution that fulﬁlls the aforementioned requirements and performs
reasonably well is the (2-parameter) truncated log-normal (with ˜ a = 1−a ∈ [0,1] in the x-axis to
ensure the negative skewness reported below).27
4.1 Baseline speciﬁcation
Consider equation (11). Three points are worth mentioning before presenting some results. Firstly
and unsurprisingly every dollarization ratio Xt we considered has a unit root28 and to avoid well-
known biases in the estimation of autoregressive coefﬁcients when a unit root is present we estimate








27 The use of this distribution renders the same cross-country comparison than a (2-parameter) Beta distribution or a
(3-parameter) truncated skew-normal distribution.
28 Results of unit root tests are available upon request to the authors. See also appendix B.
18Appendix A shows that (14) is not only the ﬁrst-differenced version of (11), but is also the result of
aggregating (10) after ﬁrst-differentiating. Hence, the coefﬁcients in (14) are indeed the same as in
(11). The disturbance U
†
t is autocorrelated and heteroscedastic29 so robust inference is required.
Secondly, due to data limitations it is not possible to estimate equation (14) as it stands. Data are
ﬁnite, so a truncation in the lags of the AR(¥) process is unavoidable.
Lastly, if convenient, we consider even richer dynamics than the suggested by our very stylized
theoretical model by introducing a MA(1) component in (14). In practice, this fact has no other
implication for our analysis than to produce better estimates of the As. As noted by Lewbel (1994),
with a MA component present only a ﬁnite number of the moments of F(a) can be recovered as an
inﬁnite autoregression in Xt (or in DXt) cannot be separated from the MA parameter, say θ. This is a
theoretical rather than empirically substantive concern; as noted earlier, our attempt is not to recover
every moment of F(a), but just the ﬁrst few.
We gathered information for Peru and Uruguay (two highly dollarized countries), Mexico and
Poland. Data are quarterly spanning roughly from the mid-1980’s to the mid-2000’s. As it is
customaryinthedollarizationliterature,Xt ismeasuredastheratioofforeigncurrencydepositsfrom
the private sector in the domestic banking system to M2.30 This information is widely available and
our sources are the websites of the various central banks and the International Financial Statistics
database, IFS. The regression with the shortest time series (Poland) has N = 69 observations; the
one with the largest (Peru), N = 94.
4.1.1 Results
29 See Pesaran (2003) for further details.
30 A popular alternative deﬁnition of the dollarization ratio discriminate between residents and non-residents, which
includes deposits by residents abroad (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003). We did not include this deﬁnition in our empirical
work as the corresponding available time series are shorter for the pool of countries analyzed.
19For each country an ARIMA(2,1,0) was ﬁrst ﬁtted. Then, we test for residual autocorrelation and
include further lags until the residuals appear serially uncorrelated. In every case, no more than
2 lags is needed, but in Mexico when the lag length is 4. For robustness sake we then include a
MA component in the best autoregressive speciﬁcation. Table 1 reports for each country the best
autoregressive model, ARIMA(2,1,1) or ARIMA(4,1,0), and the corresponding ARIMA(2,1,1) or
ARIMA(4,1,1) equations. The column labelled θ contains the estimated MA coefﬁcient. For each
country we have marked our preferred speciﬁcation, i.e. the more parsimonious model that describes
the data sufﬁciently well, with a ?.
A ﬁnding that is robust among countries and speciﬁcations within the same country, is that the
coefﬁcients A1 and A2 are signiﬁcantly positive. Recall that A1 is the mean of F(a) and A2 is its
variance. Besides, the estimates of the implied third central moment A3 −A1A2 in each country
suggest that F(a) is skewed to the left. Provided that A1 > 0, a left-skewed F(a) would be expected
if it were the mixture of a mass point above the mean (relatively persistent individuals, those who
change their portfolio slowly) and some individuals with a close to zero (corresponding to those
who change their portfolio quickly). Negative skewness, thus, is consistent with a ﬁnancial expert
sharing the dollar market with a non-expert blacksmith saving in dollars.
A remarkable fact from Table 1 is that the estimates for Peru are close to those of Uruguay, whereas
the Mexican estimates are similar to the Polish. Recall that Peru and Uruguay are heavily dollarized
(above 50%), whereas Mexico and Poland, even though have reported sizeable dollarization ratios
bytheearlyormid-90’s,havedollarizationratioslessthan30%bytheendofthesample.InPeruand
Uruguay the coefﬁcients are of comparable magnitude, A2 ≈ A1, which means that the underlying
F(a) is very spread, the a’s are fairly heterogeneous.31 Hence, the highly dollarized economies
appear to have a spreader F(a) which is consistent with the idea of decreasing participation costs as
31 These estimates imply a coefﬁcient of variation
√
A2/A1 of 2.18 for Peru, 1.75 for Uruguay, 0.91 for Mexico and
0.71 for Poland.
20dollarization expands. Furthermore, when parameterize F(a), we found the dollarized countries are
more heavily skewed than Mexico and Poland. The estimate of the mass of persistent individuals,
Pr(0.5 ≤ a ≤ 1), is roughly 0.85 for Peru and Uruguay and about 0.60 for Mexico and Poland.
4.2 Augmented speciﬁcation
Consider now equation (13). In the likely case that signal Sit is not iid, then the estimates of Table 1
may be biased due to the omission of relevant variables. Next, we augment the ARIMA models of
Table 1 to investigate whether this omission changes our main conclusions.












where pX and pR are ﬁnite lag lengths. The presence of DRt and its lags in (15) follows directly
from the fact that the individuals in the theoretical model base their decisions exclusively on this




















As Rt = RD
t −RP
t , equation (16) encompasses (15) which is a restricted version with BD
s = −BP
s for
every s. For this reason, we will focus on (16) from now on.32
An empirical issue that raises with the introduction of the real returns in the aggregate equations is,
precisely, how to measure them. The “true” returns involve expectations of future macroeconomic
variables, which historical data are barely available for the countries in our analysis. Call iP
t and iD
t
the nominal interest rates in domestic currency and US dollars, respectively, δt the nominal depre-
32 The estimations of (15), which are similar to our purposes, are available upon request to the authors.
21ciation (i.e., the percent change of the nominal exchange rate, domestic currency per US dollar) and























CPI and nominal exchange data are readily available. For iP
t we use the deposit rate in domestic
currency for Peru, Poland and Uruguay and the saving rate in domestic currency for Mexico. For iD
t ,
we found data on the interest rate paid to domestic deposits in dollars only in the case of Peru and
Uruguay. For Mexico and Poland we approximate iD
t with the deposit rate in the US.33 Our sources
are still the central banks and the IFS.
Finally, the presence of a contemporaneous return (16) may rise the possibility of endogeneity bias.
We use a 2SLS procedure to estimate this equation. The instruments are listed in the note to Table
2. It is worth mentioning that OLS or the exclusion of the contemporaneous returns did not alter the
main results of this robustness check.34
4.2.1 Results
Table 2 displays the estimation results. To save space we do not report the coefﬁcients of the returns
(as they are not of direct interest for our analysis) but do report an F-statistic assessing its overall
signiﬁcance. We set the lag length pX =3. This is the best choice for Mexico; for the other countries,
the optimal is pX = 2, but we still set pX = 3 to ensure that no autoregressive effect is ignored. The
33 Unfortunately we could not ﬁnd time series long enough of country risk to have a better measure of RD
t in these two
countries. The estimation results, though, were robust when we considered the LIBOR rate (in US dollars, at various
terms) instead of the US deposit rate.
34 We did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant cointegration relationship between Xt, RP
t and RD
t or between Xt and Rt to treat (16) as
an error correction model. Structural breaks in our 20 year data span may explain this failure. Consistently with this,
the levels of the returns did not appear to have enough explanatory power in the equations of Table 2.
22choice of pR, reported in the table, responds to the minimization of the Schwarz criterion.
Recall that by estimating the augmented equations we are assessing whether the results of Table
1 are robust. So, are they robust? In general they are. A quick comparison of the estimates in
Table 2 with those in Table 1 reveals that due to the presence of the returns, the ﬁt of the
various equations increases, but the estimates of A1, A2 and A3 −A1A2 do not change much. The
notable exception to this pattern is the Mexican case when the returns are measured in the ex-post
manner, as A1 losses statistical signiﬁcance.35 However, the main claim of the previous sections still
holds, qualitatively and almost quantitative: the heterogeneity of decision-makers that underlies the
aggregate dollarization ratios is high, and this fact leads to aggregate dollarization persistence.
5 Caveat: The role of learning
An alternative way to rationalize the fact that individuals are heterogeneous in their forecast of Rt
is to assume that they cannot perfectly observe the true process that governs the evolution of Rt.
For instance, because they do not know the exact value of α in (3). In this case, individuals should
form priors on the value of this parameter in order to forecast Rt and to make their portfolio choices.
Agents may have different priors on α, but they can update those priors as new information on Rt
arrives.36
This assumption is plausible in circumstances where the central bank does not have an explicit
inﬂation target or it has one that is not perfectly credible, for instance because it attempts to stabilize
simultaneously the exchange rate and the inﬂation rate. Uncertainty of this type may induce positive
expected values for Rt, since some agents might expect higher levels of inﬂation, making more
proﬁtable to invest in dollar assets.
35 The same conclusion holds when we analyze the parameterized distributions.
36 For models with learning and heterogenous priors, see Arifovic (1996) and Marim´ on et. al (2004).
23Consider a common signal, Sit = St = Rt +εt where εt ∼ iid(0,σ2
ε) is an aggregate shock. Under
this type of uncertainty, the perceived law of motion for Rt of individual i, becomes
ˆ rit+1 = µ(1− ˆ αit)+ ˆ αit ˆ rit +ωt (17)
Although every agent faces the same signal extraction problem, they portfolio choices differ since
they have different priors of α. In this case the optimal portfolio allocation for individual i would
be given by











where ξi,t =εt+Rt−ˆ rit. Notice that the implications for aggregation and heterogeneity are different
in this case to those obtained in the baseline model. Here, all agents have the same ability to
extract information, but they differ on their priors on α. Since, agents update their beliefs as new
information arrives, heterogeneity is not a permanent or structural feature, it only lasts while agents
learn the true value of α.
This fact have remarkable implications, but complicates considerably the empirical implementation
of model. Firstly, the degree of aggregate persistence would decrease as agents learn, since the
dispersion on the values of ˆ αit would decrease, therefore, the coefﬁcients of equation (11) would
be time varying. Although the available sample used in the empirical analysis is relatively short, no
strong evidence of time varying parameters was found. Secondly, the speed of the reduction on the
degree of persistence would depend on the dispersion of the initial distribution of priors on α: if
initial dispersion is high, the reduction on the persistence would be slower. Finally, central banks
that adopt a credible inﬂation target regime for conducting monetary policy, can help not only to
reduce the mean value of dollarization but also its persistence by reducing the dispersion on the
24priors that individuals have on α.
6 Concluding remarks
In countries with high dollarization ratios, participation in the dollar deposit market has become
massive. Financial deregulation, liberalization, innovation and informal currency markets have
allowed a very heterogenous group of agents – from a large ﬁrm that uses state-of-art portfolio
management techniques to uninformed individuals who base their portfolio decisions simply on
their own experience and limited information – to participate in the same market. This paper shows
that such an heterogeneity turns out to be enough to generate persistence in dollarization ratios
upon aggregation. Empirical evidence from three Latin American countries and Poland supports
this claim.
The presence of heterogeneity in individual dollarization decisions has interesting policy
implications. Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) conclude sensibly that a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for dedollarization is higher exchange rate ﬂexibility. In our setup this condition is not sufﬁcient
(though we reckon it is necessary), as there may exist a mass of individuals that do not respond at
all to such a volatility. This makes a case for a more active policy on improving the communication
skills of the central bank, in order to better convey its policy of more ﬂexible exchange rates and
possibly its commitment to price stability to a broader set of agents, specially to those regarded as
uninformed. In this way the policymaker would be contributing to reduce individual heterogeneity
and thus aggregate persistence.
This policy implication is particularly relevant for developing economies with an inﬂation targeting
regimeorforthoseevaluatingmovingtowardsthisregime,asitheavilyreliesupontransparencyand
communicationstrategies.Ouranalysissuggeststhatthebeneﬁtsofsuchapolicyregimeinreducing
25dollarization may be condemned to be limited, unless the central bank effectively communicates the
implications and beneﬁts of such a regime to the less informed segment of participants in the dollar
market.
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A.1 Equations (11) and (12)
Consider equation (10),
xt = axt−1+c+ut (A1)
where ut = bSt. Note that c and ut are individual speciﬁc and hence depend on a. Since by
assumption St is a sequence of serially uncorrelated shocks, so is ut.
Let Ea be the expectation operator across individuals, Ea[z] =
R
zdF(a), such that Xt = Ea[xt],
C = Ea[c] andUt = Ea[ut]. Aggregation of (A1) renders
Xt = Ea[axt−1]+C+Ut (A2)
Deﬁne a random variable αs, a scalar As = Ea[αs] and a recursion αs+1 = (αs −As)a with initial
condition α1 = a. Note that for s > 1 the above recursion implies that αs = as−å
s−1
j=1as−jAr. After
taking Ea expectations we get equation (12) in the main text, where ms = Ea[as] is the s-th moment




where cov(αs,c) is the cross-sectional covariance of αs and c which is time-invariant. On the other
side, cov(αs,ut−s) is the cross-sectional covariance of αs and ut−s which is time dependent, but as
this dependency comes from St, it is serially uncorrelated.














28Let Vt = å
¥
j=1cov(αj,ut−j) and ˜ V = E[Vt], where E is the expectation operator over time. Deﬁne
also ˜ C =C+å
¥
j=1cov(αj,c)+ ˜ V and ˜ Ut =Ut +Vt − ˜ V. Then, after plugging (A4) into (A2) we get
equation (11) in the main text, Xt = å
¥
j=1AjXt−j + ˜ C+ ˜ Ut, where ˜ Ut is serially uncorrelated.37 The
underlying assumptions behind the aggregate equation (11) are thus, that ˜ C and Vt are both ﬁnite or
the sequences {cov(αj,c)}¥
j=1 and {cov(αj,ut−j)}¥
j=1 are absolute summable.
A.2 Equation (14)
Consider now equation (A1) in ﬁrst differences
Dxt = aDxt−1+ut −ut−1 (A5)



















which corresponds to the ﬁrst-difference version or (11). The new aggregate error U
†
t is serially
correlated and the coefﬁcients are the same as those in (11).
A.3 Equation (13)
All the results derived above go through straightforwardly when St = Rt + εt where εt is iid.
Coefﬁcients a and b and the noise εt are individual speciﬁc whereas Rt is an aggregate ﬁgure,


















37 Pesaran (2003) shows that it is heteroscedastic, though.





manipulation leads to (13). The aggregate disturbance ˆ Ut is serially correlated.
B A brief note on fractional integration
Consider the univariate dynamic model
F(L)(1−L)dXt = Q(L)ηt (B1)
where L is the lag operator, ηt ∼ iid(0,σ2
η) and d is the differencing parameter. When d = 0, Xt is
stationary and follows an ARMA process, F(L)Xt = Q(L)ηt. When d = 1, Xt has a unit root and
hence follows an ARIMA process, F(L)DXt = Q(L)ηt. More generally, when d takes non-integer
values, Xt is said to be a fractionally integrated ARMA (ARFIMA) process. When d ∈ (0,0.5], the
autocovariance function of Xt declines hyperbolically to zero, making Xt a stationary long-memory
process. For d > 0.5, Xt is non-stationary (has inﬁnite variance).
Granger (1980) has shown that under particular assumptions about F(a) – the distribution of
individual autoregressive coefﬁcients – the aggregation of AR(1) processes like (10) leads to (B1).38
In our empirical application, we simply imposed d =1 and proceeded. If d <1 truly, then we would
have over-differentiated the data, with possible negative effects in our statistical inference.
TableB1 displaysestimatesof d andtests H0 :d =0and H0 :d =1. Wedidnotﬁnd enoughevidence
to reject H0 : d = 1 whereas H0 : d = 0 is systematically rejected.
Table B1. Estimated fractional integration parameter in dollarization ratios
H0 : d = 0 H0 : d = 1
ˆ d t-stat p-value t-stat p-value
Mexico 0.825 2.376 0.0491 0.505 0.6294
Peru 0.932 3.883 0.0037 0.282 0.7843
Poland 0.955 4.605 0.0025 0.219 0.8333
Uruguay 0.788 2.485 0.0378 0.667 0.5236
The estimation method is that of Geweke and Porter-Hudak (known as GPH). The asymptotic standard error of ˆ d is
π2/6 which is used to compute the t-statistics and p-values. Both tests (H0 : d = 0 and H0 : d = 1) are two-tailed. See
Baillie (1996) for a review of ARFIMA modelling and for critics to the GPH estimator.
38 See also Baillie (1996) and Zaffaroni (2004).
30C The distribution of endowments and abilities
Our results were derived under the assumption that agents are homogenous in their endowments. In
particular, we restricted the analysis to the case where each agent has an endowment of size one.
Here, we show that our results hold for a more general case, one in which agents have different size
of endowments, but where the distribution of abilities (ai) across agents is correlated with that of
the endowments. We regard this correlation as plausible in reality.
Consider equation (10). For the sake of argument, set µ = 0 so ci = 0, deﬁne uit = biSit and assume
that aggregate income is equal to one and that there are two agents in the economy: one with ability
a1 and income n1 and the other with ability a2 and income n2 = 1−n1. Then,
(1−aiL)xit = uit for i = 1,2 (C1)
After generating a common lag polynomial for both processes we have that
(1−ajL)(1−aiL)xit = (1−ajL)uit for i = 1,2 and i 6= j (C2)
The aggregate level of dollar deposits, which coincides with the aggregate dollarization ratio, is
Xt = n1x1t +n2x2t. Aggregate the equations in (C2) to get
(1−a1L)(1−a2L)Xt = n1(1−a2L)u1t +n2(1−a1L)u2t (C3)
Deﬁne ˜ uit = niuit for i = 1,2. Then, (C3) boils down to
Xt = (a1+a2)Xt−1+a1a2Xt−2+ ˜ u1t −a2 ˜ u1t−1+ ˜ u2t −a1 ˜ u2t−1 (C4)
We have that if St is an iid sequence, the aggregate dollarization ratio follows an ARMA(2,1)
process. This simple example can be generalizad to the case of N AR(1) process (hence N ability or
endowment levels); in such a case the aggregate dollarization ratio follows an ARMA(N∗, N∗−1)
process, where N∗ ≤ N. We can increase the number of agents involved by simply replicating the
individual behavior for a given ability a an arbitrary number of times. Therefore, the aggregation
results derived in appendix A go through under the assumption that the distribution of endowments
is correlated to that of the abilities to process information. When N → ¥, we get the limiting case
exposed in appendix B. These derivations apply straightforwardly to the alternative case where Sit
is not iid.
31Figure 1. Deposit Dollarization in Peru
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Source: Central Bank of Peru.
Figure 2. Deposit Dollarization in Poland
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Source: National Bank of Poland.
32Table 1. ARIMA models of the deposit dollarization ratio in selected countries
ARIMA model A1 A2 A3 A4 θ A3−A1A2 ¯ R2
Mexico (1985.Q4 to 2005.Q3, N = 77)
(4,1,0) 0.221∗ 0.199∗ −0.192∗ 0.114∗∗ −0.236∗ 0.221
(0.078) (0.078) (0.072) (0.064) (0.095)
(4,1,1)? 0.480∗ 0.195∗ −0.216∗ 0.251∗ −0.097∗ −0.310∗ 0.261
(0.111) (0.094) (0.063) (0.047) (0.018) (0.086)
Peru (1980.Q1 to 2005.Q3, N = 94)
(2,1,0)? 0.173∗ 0.142∗ −0.024∗∗ 0.200
(0.063) (0.058) (0.013)
(2,1,1) 0.186∗∗ 0.139∗ −0.058 −0.026 0.173
(0.094) (0.065) (0.143) (0.016)
Poland (1985.Q4 to 2002.Q4, N = 69)
(2,1,0)? 0.474∗ 0.113∗ −0.053∗ 0.215
(0.016) (0.052) (0.024)
(2,1,1) 0.476∗ 0.111∗ −0.007 −0.053∗ 0.275
(0.010) (0.049) (0.045) (0.024)
Uruguay (1985.Q1 to 2005.Q3, N = 83)
(2,1,0) 0.218∗ 0.290∗ −0.063∗ 0.153
(0.091) (0.116) (0.029)
(2,1,1)? 0.265∗∗ 0.215∗ −0.093∗ −0.057∗∗ 0.196
(0.147) (0.055) (0.034) (0.033)
Maximum likelihood estimates. Figures in parentheses are robust (consistent) standard errors. * [**] denotes
signiﬁcance at a 5% [10%] level. The standard error of the third central moment A3 −A1A2 was computed with the
delta method. ¯ R2 is the adjusted R2. Regressions include a constant and, if necessary, a few dummy variables for
outlier removal. In all reported equations, Breusch-Godfrey and Jarque-Bera tests suggested uncorrelated and normally
distributed residuals. The preferred speciﬁcations are marked with a ?.
33Table 2. Augmented equations
A1 A2 A3 A3−A1A2 H0 : B = 0 pR ¯ R2
Mexico (1985.Q4 to 2005.Q3, N = 77)
ex-ante 0.391∗ 0.202∗ −0.273∗ −0.331∗ 11.50∗ 2 0.554
(0.096) (0.066) (0.092) (0.113) [0.000]
ex-post 0.229 0.287∗ −0.240∗ −0.278∗ 22.56∗ 2 0.565
(0.201) (0.089) (0.080) (0.091) [0.000]
Peru (1980.Q1 to 2005.Q3, N = 89)
ex-ante 0.242∗ 0.195∗ 0.003 −0.047∗ 9.086∗ 3 0.435
(0.043) (0.047) (0.053) (0.015) [0.000]
ex-post 0.501∗ 0.138∗∗ −0.027 −0.069∗∗ 30.85∗ 2 0.649
(0.098) (0.083) (0.068) (0.036) [0.000]
Poland (1985.Q4 to 2005.Q3, N = 68)
ex-ante 0.449∗ 0.132∗ −0.002 −0.059∗ 1.638 3 0.275
(0.043) (0.058) (0.049) (0.022) [0.203]
ex-post 0.586∗ 0.164∗ −0.123 −0.096∗ 2.402∗∗ 4 0.394
(0.077) (0.070) (0.160) (0.043) [0.099]
Uruguay (1985.Q1 to 2005.Q3, N = 80)
ex-ante 0.252∗ 0.280∗ −0.109 −0.070∗∗ 3.153∗ 3 0.124
(0.104) (0.114) (0.140) (0.038) [0.049]
ex-post 0.267∗ 0.349∗ −0.073 −0.093∗∗ 2.189 2 0.152
(0.103) (0.117) (0.143) (0.047) [0.119]
2SLS estimates. Instruments for RD
t and RP
t (and for the ex-ante RD
t−1 and RP
t−1) are oil prices changes, US GDP growth
and lagged values of these and the R-variables. Figures in parentheses are robust (consistent) standard errors. * [**]
denotes signiﬁcance at a 5% [10%] level. Figures in the H0 : B = 0 column are F-statistics, p-values shown in braces.
For Peru, Poland and Uruguay, we set A3 =0 to compute the third central moment and its standard deviation. Diagnostic
tests suggested well-behaved residuals, see notes to Table 1.
34Documentos de Trabajo publicados 
 Working Papers published 
 
 
La serie de Documentos de Trabajo puede obtenerse de manera gratuita en formato 
pdf en la siguiente dirección electrónica: 
http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/bcr/index.php?Itemid=213
 






Marzo \ March 
 
DT N° 2007-003 
Why Central Banks Smooth Interest Rates?: A Political Economy Explanation  
Carlos Montoro 
 
Febrero \ February 
 
DT N° 2007-002 
Comercio y crecimiento: Una revisión de la hipótesis “Aprendizaje por las 
Exportaciones” 
Raymundo Chirinos Cabrejos 
 
Enero \ January 
 
DT N° 2007-001 
Perú: Grado de inversión, un reto de corto plazo 





Octubre \ October 
 
DT N° 2006-010 
Dolarización financiera, el enfoque de portafolio y expectativas:  
Evidencia para América Latina (1995-2005) 
Alan Sánchez 
 
DT N° 2006-009 
Pass–through del tipo de cambio y política monetaria: 
Evidencia empírica de los países de la OECD 
César Carrera, Mahir Binici 
 
Agosto \ August 
 
DT N° 2006-008 
Efectos no lineales de choques de política monetaria y de tipo de cambio real en 
economías parcialmente dolarizadas: un análisis empírico para el Perú 
Saki Bigio, Jorge Salas 
 Junio \ June 
 
DT N° 2006-007 
Corrupción e Indicadores de Desarrollo: Una Revisión Empírica 
Saki Bigio, Nelson Ramírez-Rondán 
 
DT N° 2006-006 
Tipo de Cambio Real de Equilibrio en el Perú: modelos BEER y construcción de 
bandas de confianza 
Jesús Ferreyra y Jorge Salas 
 
DT N° 2006-005 
Hechos Estilizados de la Economía Peruana 
Paul Castillo, Carlos Montoro y Vicente Tuesta 
 
DT N° 2006-004 
El costo del crédito en el Perú, revisión de la evolución reciente 
Gerencia de Estabilidad Financiera 
 
DT N° 2006-003 
Estimación de la tasa natural de interés para la economía peruana 
Paul Castillo, Carlos Montoro y Vicente Tuesta 
 
Mayo \ May  
 
DT N° 2006-02 
El Efecto Traspaso de la tasa de interés y la política monetaria en el Perú: 1995-2004 
Alberto Humala  
 
Marzo \ March  
 
DT N° 2006-01 
¿Cambia la Inflación Cuando los Países Adoptan Metas Explícitas de Inflación? 





Diciembre \ December 
 
DT N° 2005-008 
El efecto traspaso de la tasa de interés y la política monetaria en el Perú 1995-2004 
Erick Lahura 
 
Noviembre \ November 
 
DT N° 2005-007 
Un Modelo de Proyección BVAR Para la Inflación Peruana 
Gonzalo Llosa, Vicente Tuesta y Marco Vega  
 
DT N° 2005-006 
Proyecciones desagregadas de la variación del Índice de Precios al Consumidor (IPC), 
del Índice de Precios al Por Mayor (IPM) y del Crecimiento del Producto Real (PBI) 
Carlos R. Barrera Chaupis  
Marzo \ March  
 
DT N° 2005-005 
Crisis de Inflación y Productividad Total de los Factores en Latinoamérica 
Nelson Ramírez Rondán y Juan Carlos Aquino. 
 
DT N° 2005-004 
Usando información adicional en la estimación de la brecha producto en el Perú: una 
aproximación multivariada de componentes no observados 
Gonzalo Llosa y Shirley Miller. 
 
DT N° 2005-003 
Efectos del Salario Mínimo en el Mercado Laboral Peruano 
Nikita R. Céspedes Reynaga 
 
Enero \ January  
 
DT N° 2005-002 
Can Fluctuations in the Consumption-Wealth Ratio Help to Predict Exchange Rates? 
Jorge Selaive y Vicente Tuesta 
 
DT N° 2005-001 
How does a Global disinflation drag inflation in small open economies? 
Marco Vega y Diego Winkelreid  